{"id":4672,"date":"2024-05-24T20:48:11","date_gmt":"2024-05-24T20:48:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/artificialintelligenceact.eu\/?p=4672"},"modified":"2024-05-24T20:48:25","modified_gmt":"2024-05-24T20:48:25","slug":"robust-governance-for-the-ai-act","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/artificialintelligenceact.eu\/robust-governance-for-the-ai-act\/","title":{"rendered":"Robust governance for the AI Act: Insights and highlights from Novelli et al. (2024)"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
In their recent publication on robust European AI governance, Claudio Novelli, Philipp Hacker, Jessica Morley, Jarle Trondal, and Luciano Floridi pursue two main objectives: explaining the governance framework of the AI Act and providing recommendations to ensure its uniform and coordinated execution (Novelli et al., 2024).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The following provides a selective overview of the publication, with a particular focus on the AI Office and GPAI. It is important to note that this overview refrains from introducing new perspectives, but focuses solely on reiterating the most relevant findings of the publication for clarity and accessibility for policymakers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u2022 Harmonise AIA implementation and enforcement across the EU \u2022 Support implementing and delegated acts \u2022 Standardization and best practices \u2022 Assist in the establishment and operation of regulatory sandboxes \u2022 Assess and monitor GPAIs and aid investigations into rule violations \u2022 Provide administrative support to other bodies (Board, Advisory Forum, Scientific Panel) \u2022 Consult and cooperate with stakeholders \u2022 Cooperate with other relevant DG and services of the Commission – International cooperation<\/td><\/tr>
\u2022 Facilitate consistent and effective application of the AIA \u2022 Coordinate national competent authorities \u2022 Harmonise administrative practices. \u2022 Issue recommendations and opinions (upon requests of the Commission) \u2022 Support the establishment and operation of regulatory sandboxes \u2022 Gather feedback on GPAI-related alerts<\/td><\/tr>
\u2022 Provide technical expertise \u2022 Prepare opinions and recommendations (upon request of the Board and the Commission) \u2022 Establish sub-groups for examining specific questions \u2022 Prepare an annual report on activities<\/td><\/tr>
\u2022 Support enforcement of AI regulation, especially for GPAI \u2022 Provide advice on the classification of AI models with systemic risk \u2022 Alert AI Office of systemic risks \u2022 Develop evaluation tools and methodologies for GPAIs \u2022 Support market surveillance authorities and cross-border activities<\/td><\/tr>
\u2022 Process applications for notification from conformity assessment bodies (CABs) \u2022 Monitor CABs \u2022 Cooperate with authorities from other Member States \u2022 Ensure no conflict of interest with conformity assessment bodies \u2022 Conflict of interest prevention and assessment impartiality<\/td><\/tr>
\u2022 Verify the conformity of highrisk AI systems \u2022 Issue certifications \u2022 Manage and document subcontracting arrangements \u2022 Periodic assessment activities (audits) \u2022 Participate in coordination activities and European standardization<\/td><\/tr>
\u2022 Non-compliance investigation and correction for high-risk AI systems (e.g., risk measures) \u2022 Real-world testing oversight and serious incident report management \u2022 Guide and advice on the implementation of the regulation, particularly to SMEs and start-ups \u2022 Consumer protection and fair competition support<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table>Table 2. Structures, compositions, missions, and tasks of the institutional bodies involved in the AIA implementation and enforcement. Adapted from Novelli et al. (2024).<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\nFigure 1. Supranational and national bodies involved in the implementation and enforcement of the AIA (Novelli et al., 2024).<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n
3.1 The AI Office<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
1. Institutional composition and operational autonomy<\/h6>\n\n\n\n
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Novelli et al. note that the Office\u2019s precise organizational structure and operational autonomy remain ambiguous. No provisions, either in the AIA or in the Commission\u2019s decision, have been established regarding the composition of the AI Office, its collaborative dynamics with the various Connects within the DG, or the extent of its operational autonomy. Novelli et al. hypothesize that this absence is likely justified by the expectation that the Office will partially use existing infrastructure of DG-CNECT. Nevertheless, Novelli et al. underscore that expert hiring and substantial funding will present significant challenges, as the Office will compete with some of the best-funded private companies on the planet.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
Regarding its operational autonomy, the Office\u2019s incorporation in DG-CNECT means that the DG\u2019s management plan will guide the AI Office\u2019s strategic priorities. Novelli et al. note that this integration directly influences the scope and direction of the AI Office\u2019s initiatives. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
2. Mission(s) and task<\/h6>\n\n\n\n
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The primary mission of the AI Office, according to the Commission Decision, is to ensure the harmonized implementation and enforcement of AIA (Art 2, point 1 of the Decision). The Decision also outlines auxiliary missions, such as enhancing a strategic EU approach to global AI \u201cinitiatives\u201d, promoting actions that maximize AI\u2019s social and economic benefits, supporting AI systems that boost EU competitiveness, and keeping track of AI market advancements. <\/li>\n\n\n\n
Novelli et al. consider this very broad wording, one interpretation they propose is that the AI Office\u2019s role could go beyond the scope of the AIA to include additional AI normative frameworks (such as the revised Product Liability Directive or the Artificial Intelligence Liability Directive (AILD)). In this case, Novelli et al. observe that the Office might need restructuring into a more autonomous body, like the CERT-EU, which could necessitate detaching it from the Commission\u2019s administrative framework. <\/li>\n\n\n\n
The ambiguity in the current normative framework regarding breath and scope of the AI Office is considered a crucial aspect by Novelli et al. They consider the responsibilities assigned to the AI Office to be broadly defined, with the expectation that their precise implementation will evolve based on practical experience.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
An important aspect to consider within the operational scope of the Office is the nature of its decisions. Novelli et al. note that the AI Office does not issue binding decisions on its own, but supports and advises the Commission. They raise concern that the effectiveness of mechanisms for appealing decisions of the Commission may be compromised by the opaque nature of the AI Office\u2019s support to the Commission, its interactions within DG-CNECT, and its relationships with external bodies, such as national authorities. Novelli et al. find this issue particularly pertinent given the AI Office\u2019s engagement with external experts and stakeholders. They emphasize that documentation and disclosure of the AI Office\u2019s contributions become crucial. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
3.2 The AI Board, the Advisory Forum, and the Scientific Panel<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
1. Structures, roles and compositions of the three bodies<\/h6>\n\n\n\n
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For Novelli et al., having three separate entities with relatively similar compositions raises questions. The AI Board is understandable for ensuring representation and maintaining some independence from EU institutions. But why there is both an Advisory Forum and<\/em> a Scientific Panel is not apparent. The Forum is intended for diverse perspectives of civil society and industry, essentially acting as an institutionalized form of lobbying while balancing commercial and non-commercial interests. In contrast, the Panel consists of independent and (hopefully) unbiased experts, with specific tasks related to GPAI. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
2. Mission(s) and tasks<\/h6>\n\n\n\n
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Novelli et al. note that the Board does not have the authority to revise decisions of national supervisory agencies. They believe this may prove a distinct disadvantage, hindering the uniform application of the law if certain Member States interpret the AIA in highly idiosyncratic fashions. For instance, one may particularly think of the supervision of the limitations on surveillance tools using remote biometric identification. <\/li>\n\n\n\n
Novelli et al. consider the distinction between the Advisory Forum and the Scientific Panel less clear than the separation between the Board and the Office. They raise questions regarding the exclusivity of the Forum\u2019s support to the Board and the Commission, given that the Panel exclusively supports the AI Office directly, and whether the Panel’s specialized GPAI expertise could benefit these entities. The participation of the AI Office in Board meetings is an indirect channel for the Panel\u2019s expertise to influence broader discussions, but Novelli et al. consider this arrangement not entirely satisfactory. The Panel\u2019s specialized opinion may become less impactful, since the AI Office lacks voting power in the Board meetings. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
4. Recommendations for robust governance of the AI Act<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Building on their analysis, Novelli et al. envision the following important updates that should be made to the governance structure of the AI Act. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
4.1 Clarifying the institutional design of the AI Office<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
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Given the broad spectrum of tasks anticipated for the AI Office, more detailed organizational guidance is needed. Additionally, the Office\u2019s mandate lacks specificity concerning the criteria for selecting experts that are to carry out evaluations (Recital 164<\/a> AIA).\u00a0<\/li>\n\n\n\n
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